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Abstract
In order to design electricity markets to simultaneously reduce the share of fossil fuels in
energy production and meet the increasing demand for electricity, knowledge on consumer
preferences is necessary. The goal of this cumulative dissertation is to contribute to the
understanding of preferences of private households for electricity supply attributes in different
contexts. The guiding research questions are 1) what attributes of electricity determine private
household electricity supply preferences and 2) how do electricity preferences differ between
people and contexts.
I address the research questions in four papers which have in common the application of
the discrete choice experiment method to elicit preferences:
In Paper 1 I review statistical methods to compare two frequently applied models, the
random parameters logit and the latent class logit. The methods presented here can be readily
used by other researchers and practitioners to better understand model performance which
ultimately contributes to improving model choice in applied energy research.
Based on the empirical findings of Paper 1, Paper 2 identifies preferences of private
households in Hyderabad in India for electricity supply quality. The results indicate that
willingness to pay for improvements are, on average, rather low. However, the preferences
strongly vary between subjects.
Papers 3 and 4 investigate preferences of German private households. In Paper 3, the
respondents stated their preferences for the organization of the electricity distribution com-
pany under different renewable energy scenarios. It turned out that most people are willing
to pay more for electricity supplied by municipally-owned companies and cooperatives. This
additional willingness to pay increases disproportionally when the share of renewable energy
is high. The paper identifies non-profit orientated distribution companies as potential drivers
of the energy transition.
Paper 4 investigates the determinants for the success of energy cooperatives in Germany.
The results indicate that the governance of distribution companies impacts the choices of
private households for electricity supply contracts. Especially, people preferred cooperative-
like governance attributes. However, the willingness to pay for governance attributes was
significantly lower than the willingness to pay for increases in renewable energy.
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The overall results show that preferences and willingness to pay values for improvements
in electricity supply exist but are heterogeneous. While large willingness to pay values for
further expansion of renewable energy sources exist in Germany, private households from
India are concerned about the physical power quality and have low willingness to pay for
improvements. In both countries, the majority of people prefer state-owned distribution
companies over private companies.
Policy makers should provide options for consumers with respect to tariffs and technology.
Competitive electricity markets should be accessible for citizen-owned companies and
cooperatives and regulatory policies should remove entry barriers for smaller companies.
Such companies are more likely to facilitate an energy transition and increase the share of
renewable energy.
Zusammenfassung
Um Strommärkte so zu konzipieren damit sie sowohl zur Verringerung der Nutzung fossiler
Brennstoffe als auch zur Deckung des steigenden Energiebedarfes beitragen, ist Wissen
über die Präferenzen der Konsumenten notwendig. Die vorliegende kumulative Disserta-
tion untersucht Präferenzen für Elektrizitätsattribute von privaten Haushalten und trägt zu
einem tieferen Verständnis dieser in unterschiedlichen Kontextsituationen bei. Die zentralen
Fragestellungen sind 1) welche Attribute spielen bei der Stromversorgung privater Haushalte
eine Rolle, und 2) wie unterscheiden sich Präferenzen zwischen Menschen und zwischen
Kontexten. Die Bearbeitung dieser Forschungsfragen erfolgt in vier wissenschaftlichen
Artikeln. Discrete Choice Experimente werden als Methode zur Messung von Präferenzen
herangezogen.
Der erste Artikel betrachtet statistische Methoden um die zwei am häufigsten angewandten
Modelle – das Random Parameter Logit und das Latent Class Logit Modell – zu vergleichen.
Der Artikel trägt dazu bei, den Prozess der Modellwahl zu verbessern und für die angewandte
Forschung im Energiebereich anzupassen.
Basierend auf den empirischen Ergebnissen des ersten Artikels untersucht der zweite
Artikel die Präferenzen von privaten Haushalten in Hyderabad, Indien mit besonderem Fokus
auf die physische Qualität der Energieversorgung. Die Ergebnisse deuten auf eine geringe
Zahlungsbereitschaft der Konsumenten hin. Jedoch unterscheiden sich die Präferenzen der
Haushalte.
Die Artikel 3 und 4 basieren auf Datenerhebungen in Deutschland. Im dritten Artikel
werden die Präferenzen privater Haushalte hinsichtlich der Organisationsform von Stroman-
bietern untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Kunden bereit sind mehr zu zahlen,
wenn die Stromversorgung von Genossenschaften oder Stadtwerken übernommen wird. Die
Zahlungsbereitschaft für Strom von diesen Anbietern erhöht sich vor allem in Kombination
mit einem hohen Anteil an erneuerbarer Energie. Gemeinnützige Unternehmen können hier
als die Triebfedern der Energiewende identifiziert werden.
Der vierte Artikel betrachtet die Erfolgsfaktoren von Energiegenossenschaften in Deutsch-
land. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Governance des Stromanbieters die Zahlungsbere-
itschaft für Strom beeinflussen. Insbesondere Genossenschaften werden den großen Privatun-
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ternehmen und Aktiengesellschaften vorgezogen. Im Vergleich sind Zahlungsbereitschaften
für erneuerbare Energien jedoch deutlich höher.
Konsumenten sind bereit, für eine verbesserte Stromversorgung zu zahlen. In Deutsch-
land kann eine hohe Zahlungsbereitschaft für erneuerbare Energien beobachtet werden. In
Indien befassen sich Haushalte eher mit der physischen Stromqualität und zeigen insgesamt
geringere Zahlungsbereitschaften für Verbesserungen auf. In beiden Ländern bevorzugen die
Konsumenten staatliche Unternehmen gegenüber privaten Anbietern.
Politische Entscheidungsträger und Versorgungsunternehmen sollten Optionen in Bezug
auf Tarifmöglichkeiten und Technologien ausweiten. Konkurrenzfähige Strommärkte sollten
sowohl Genossenschaften als Geschäftsmodell zulassen als auch solche Regulierungen
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Perhaps the most important aspects of consumer behavior relevant to an economy
[...] are those of consumer reactions to new commodities and to quality variations.
Traditional theory has nothing to say on these. (Lancaster, 1966, p.133)
1.1 Current Challenges in the Electricity Sector and the
Role of the Consumer
Many developing and emerging economies lack sufficient electricity supply. About 17% of
the world’s population have no access to electricity, adversely affecting health, education, and
food security (UN-Energy, 2005; World Bank, 2015). At the same time, worldwide electricity
production accounts for 25% of total carbon dioxide emissions, being a key culprit in the
process of climate change (International Energy Agency, 2014b). Thus, finding solutions
that allow for increased electricity production while simultaneously reducing carbon dioxide
emissions has become a major global challenge (Geden and Beck, 2014; UNDP, 2002).
Around the world, policies at different scales have recently initiated a transition towards
decentralized electricity production from renewable energy sources so as to decrease the
electricity supply gap in a climate-friendly way (Bhide and Monroy, 2011; Field et al., 2014).
By 2014, 46 countries had established policies to promote renewable energy (REN21, 2015).
Yet, estimated increases in electricity production from fossil fuels still emit too much carbon
dioxide to reach the 2◦C goal (International Energy Agency, 2014a).
Electricity consumers are directly affected by these developments in the sense of being the
bearers of the consequences (e.g., changes in prices or electricity quality), but they can also
influence the process through their electricity purchasing choices. The following examples
seek to explain the role of the consumer and the current situation in the electricity sectors of
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two different contexts: India, as an example of an emerging economy, and Germany, as an
example of an industrialized country.
India presently has the highest share of growth in electricity demand in the world (In-
ternational Energy Agency, 2014a). In spite of several liberalization efforts, however, the
electricity sector is still mainly controlled by the government and is marked by insufficient
electricity grid infrastructure. Retail electricity rates often do not recover production costs,
leading to high subsidy payments for electricity which affect the overall economic perfor-
mance of the country (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006). Various governmental policies have
been aiming towards increasing electricity production as well as renewing and extending grid
infrastructure. Although many of these policies incentivize and support renewable energy
production, the largest share of additional production still comes from coal, it being the
cheapest energy source (Banerjee, 2014; Central Electricity Authority, 2004). Yet consumers
bear the consequences, suffering from air pollution and limited availability of electricity
(Ahuja, 2016). Of the country’s 1.3 billion inhabitants, 240 million Indians have no access
to electricity (International Energy Agency, 2014a), and most households that have an elec-
tricity connection face frequent power cuts and voltage fluctuations (Tongia, 2007). The
main challenge in India, then, is to satisfy increasing electricity demand, including increased
production and infrastructural investments, while simultaneously reducing carbon dioxide
emissions and restructuring the market to lower financial burdens on the government (Bhide
and Monroy, 2011).
In contrast, in Germany, one of the richest countries in the world, there is no excess
demand for electricity. Having heavily invested in renewable energy, Germany is regarded as
a pioneer in the worldwide energy transition, with a share of about 27% renewable energy in
its electricity mix in 2015 (BMWi, 2015; Wassermann et al., 2015). Its liberalized market
structure, with a large number of retail distribution companies, has led to a wide array of
contract choices for consumers, including options for regionally produced renewable energy
and participation (Schmid et al., 2016). Consumers are changing electricity-distribution
companies not only to minimize costs but also to foster change, increase the share of
renewable energy or support a specific distribution company whose goals they identify with
(Devine-Wright, 2014; Kaenzig et al., 2013). Thus, a market for electricity from renewable
energy sources has emerged, mainly because consumers have revealed themselves as being
willing to pay a premium for it voluntarily. However, the ambitious targets for reducing
carbon dioxide emissions set by the German government require new strategies to further
increase the share of renewable energy (Gährs et al., 2015).
To achieve a sustainable energy transition, meaning here sufficient worldwide electricity
supply with greatly reduced carbon dioxide emissions, it appears that understanding consumer
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preferences in the electricity sector is of crucial importance for policy makers at various
scales for at least two reasons:
First, in the electricity sector, characterized by externalities and economics of scale,
governmental intervention is often required (Müller and Rommel, 2011; Train, 1991). Gov-
ernments have limited resources and should allocate them where they can create the highest
net-benefits. The most common approach for identifying optimal allocation is cost-benefit
analysis (Wolfson, 2015), the quality of which depends greatly on available information
regarding consumer preferences and valuation. As private households are often affected by
the outcomes of government policy, it is important to understand their preferences.
Second, it is widely recognized that consumers have been stimulating the ongoing
energy transition (OECD, 2009; Schmid et al., 2016), and their actions have impacts on the
extension of renewable energy production. New incentives to promote renewable energy and
participation are, then, only likely to be effective if they are embraced by consumers. Thus it
would seem that acquiring a better understanding of their preferences could be helpful for
designing such incentives (Yildiz et al., 2015).
Information on consumer preferences are often not directly observable, however, because
electricity markets are not completely competitive, so market prices cannot be used to calcu-
late welfare changes (Freeman III et al., 2014). Additionally, electricity is a heterogeneous
good from the consumer perspective. It is not only electricity availability that matters but
its attributes, such as the share of renewable energy comprising it, location of production,
duration of scheduled and unscheduled power cuts or frequency of voltage fluctuations.
1.2 Electricity Attributes: Governance, Physical Quality,
Externalities and Location
In order to gain a systematic overview of the salient attributes of electricity, I have categorized
them into four domains – distribution company, physical quality, externalities and location –
which I will refer to in the following as who, what, how and where. In the remainder of this
section, I seek to show how each domain affects consumers and their preferences. Although
the domains are mutually exclusive, they are not necessarily independent from each other,
as they interact and influence each other, and their importance in consumer choices differs
according to context.
Distribution companies can be described with reference to their attributes and can be
distinguished according to their organizational form (e.g. profit-oriented, state-owned,
cooperative) or governance and internal policies (e.g., profit distribution, price transparency).
4 Introduction
Consumers have preferences for different types of the distribution companies. They may, for
example, not perceive a particular company as being ‘credible’ because it has only recently
entered the market, thereby bearing the risk of potential bankruptcy. Another company’s lack
of effort towards reducing carbon dioxide emissions or its treatment of employees can result
in it gaining a bad reputation and, thus, not being preferred by some consumers. Consumers
may also have preferences regarding governance structures within distribution companies,
such as their pricing policies or decision-making procedures. A company that reveals its
pricing policy may be preferred by consumers to other companies. The existing literature,
however, has hardly taken note of the link between consumer preferences and company
governance structures, which I subsume under the domain of who.
Physical electricity quality directly affects consumers and includes attributes such as
frequency and duration of power cuts and voltage stability. In countries where demand for
electricity exceeds supply and grid capacity is limited, these attributes are especially relevant.
In such areas, private households often suffer from non-availability of electricity for cooling
in summer or lighting in the evening. Some consumer groups may be more affected by
quality problems than others. It would seem obvious that higher quality is preferred by most
consumers, but what attributes are most important to them and what the trade-offs between
different attributes are has been until now largely unexplored, and the literature regarding
private household preferences is limited to a few studies focused on power cuts (Abdullah
and Mariel, 2010; Amador et al., 2013; Hanisch et al., 2010). I subsume physical quality and
its attributes under the domain what.
Externalities are generally related to the various sources used in the generation of elec-
tricity, which can be roughly grouped into two main categories: conventional electricity
production means use of fossil fuels, whereas renewable electricity relies on solar, biomass
and wind, among many others. For some consumers, the share and sources of renewable
energy used in a distributor’s mix matter, but increasing this share generally comes at a
significant cost. In Germany, private households already mandatorily pay about 20% of their
end-use price towards renewable energy, and about 11% of households voluntarily add a
premium for further extension of renewable energies (UBA, 2013b). Unlike the previously
mentioned domains, externalities related to electricity generation are perhaps the most fre-
quently covered domain in the literature, and several recent theoretical and empirical studies
have shown that, to an certain extent, consumers are willing to pay to reduce externalities
from electricity production (Ma et al., 2015; Menegaki, 2008; Soon and Ahmad, 2015; Sundt
and Rehdanz, 2015). I subsume the externalities under the domain how.
With regard to the electricity sector, location refers to where companies’ headquarters
and places of production are situated. Positive and negative externalities are also linked to the
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proximity of distribution companies. For example, close-by distribution companies may have
positive employment effects that benefit local economies. Meanwhile, negative externalities
of local production include the visibility of wind parks (Meyerhoff, 2013). In the literature,
it has been found that people prefer proximate distribution companies (Kaenzig et al., 2013),
but also here, the number of relevant studies is relatively low. I subsume location under the
domain where.
The relevance of the four just-described domains differs according to the context in which
the consumer is embedded. I define context as the interconnected conditions, including socio-
economic, cultural and geographic variables, in which electricity consumption takes place.
In order to better understand such contextual differences, the present dissertation focuses on
two case studies: one from India, representing an emerging economy, and one from Germany,
as an example of an industrialized country. In India, consumers are mostly concerned about
the physical aspects of electricity quality, and preferences related to reducing externalities
are of secondary rank (Hanisch et al., 2010). Meanwhile, in Germany, the physical quality
of electricity is perceived by the consumer to be at a nearly-optimal level –so much so that
it is taken for granted – and basic needs related to electricity are generally easily satisfied.
Consequently, questions regarding externalities and location have become more important.
In addition to differences in preferences due to context, people with differing social status,
socio-demographic characteristics, attitudes and perceptions may have different preferences.
How preferences differ within a context can have implications for aggregated preferences
within it (Greene and Hensher, 2003).
To sum up, consumer preferences regarding electricity may be shaped by the four domains
who, what, how and where, which themselves can vary according to context. The literature
does not have much to say about the who and where, while the what has been relatively
well covered. The how has been researched most frequently, and a variety of meta-studies
summarizing relevant results already exist. Table 1.1 overviews these domains, providing
examples of attributes important to consumers and how well they have been covered in the
literature.
1.3 Theoretical Framework and Method
The theoretical framework developed for the present study seeks to explain the process
of how consumer choices in the electricity sector are made, based on the neoclassical
paradigm of preferences and utility. As the neoclassical approach does not explain differences
in preferences between people and seems inadequate for describing the complexity of
the domains who, what, how and where of electricity, I have extended it using theories
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Domain Attributes Literature Coverage
Who
Organizational form
No studies availablePrice transparency
Decision making
What
Power cuts Some studies (Abdullah and Mariel,





Share of renewable energy Numerous studies (Ma et al., 2015;
Menegaki, 2008; Soon and Ahmad,
2015; Sundt and Rehdanz, 2015)
Sources of renewable energy
Where
Location of distribution company Few studies (Kaenzig et al., 2013;
Meyerhoff, 2013)Location of production
Table 1.1 Domains and examples of attributes relevant to electricity consumers
developed by Maslow (1943) and Lancaster (1966). Maslow’s hierarchy of needs can
enhance understanding of preference differences across individual people and contexts,
whereas Lancaster’s household production framework relates attributes to goods, which is
key for modeling electricity preferences.
People have needs. But Maslow (1943) argues that higher needs, such as esteem, be-
come truly relevant only after the most fundamental needs have been satisfied1. Needs are
embedded into the contexts in which consumers make their choices. In different contexts,
needs can be differently satisfied. They can be satisfied through services, which can be
concrete (e.g. temperature regulation), but also through more complex phenomena (e.g.
charitable giving). In combination with other variables (e.g., individual income, attitudes,
perceptions), people construct preference relations for services (Costanza et al., 2007). A
consumer cannot buy services themselves on markets, but she can buy combinations of goods
that can help to accomplish such services to the required level. In other words, goods are
inputs to produce services (Lancaster, 1966), with each good consisting of a number of
attributes or attribute levels. There are also ordinal utility functions that assign numerical
values, producing rankings for alternative combinations of goods (Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
Each consumer maximizes their own utility function under constraints, leading to a demand
function, which then determines his choices for goods. Because goods are described by
1Maslow’s approach has often been criticized and modified (Tay and Diener, 2011). However, for the
purposes of this study, it is sufficient to understand its basic logic, which is still generally accepted in the social
sciences.
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their attributes, demand functions can be expressed in attribute space, meaning that they can
indicate demand for attributes or attribute levels in relation to prices and other variables.
Context: India
Preference relations for temperature regulation (e.g. 25°C preferred to 26°C)







Need for shelter (need for protection from heat or cold)
Can be accomplished with combination of goods 
(e.g. ceiling fan + electricity)
Goods consist of attributes
(e.g. frequency of power cuts)
Service: temperature regulation
observed (income, age), unobserved (attitudes, perceptions)
Fig. 1.1 Theoretical framework exemplified via cooling devices in the Indian context
The following example seeks to illustrate how application of this framework works in the
Indian electricity sector (see Fig. 1.1). In India, many people struggle to satisfy their need
for shelter, which includes protection from very hot or cold temperatures. Here, the required
service is temperature regulation. Depending on other variables (average outside temperature,
individual perception of heat), preference relations for room temperature are formed (e.g.
25◦C is preferred to 26◦C, 20◦C is preferred to 19◦C and so on). Temperature regulation
can be produced through various combinations of goods that are traded on a market: air
conditioners in combination with electricity, ceiling fans in combination with electricity, or
special ways in which houses can be constructed (without any electricity required). Each
good consists of different attributes, such as how fast and to what extent an air conditioner
can regulate room temperature. Electricity is also a good that can be distinguished according
to its attributes. In order to attain an optimal temperature level, consumers need to purchase
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marketed goods that are largely conditional on the attributes of electricity. In this example,
the domain what is relevant. For an air conditioner, stable electricity supply is more important
than for a ceiling fan. Thus, a consumer with an air conditioner is likely to have a stronger
preference for stable voltage than a consumer who has a ceiling fan, all other things being
equal.
This example reveals some challenges in measuring electricity preferences. In India,
voltage-level fluctuations are exogenously determined. If consumers were to have a choice,
then, it is likely that they would chose a lower level of voltage fluctuation and would be
willing to pay for it. As the resulting choice is not observable, however, it is not possible to
infer information on such consumer preferences and willingness to pay. This information
is, nonetheless, a critical input for designing efficient policies in the electricity sector, as
discussed above.
Elicitation of such unobservable preferences can be approximated using non-market
valuation methods (Bateman et al., 2002). Various non-market valuation methods exist and
can be distinguished into revealed and stated preference methods. Revealed preference
methods take advantage of observable choices regarding market goods that are substitutes or
complements for non-market goods. Most prominent here are the hedonic pricing and travel
cost methods. In contrast, stated preference methods do not require market observations.
The idea is to hypothetically ask respondents to state their appreciation, often expressed as
willingness to pay, for a non-market good. Currently, the most widely used stated preference
methods are contingent valuation and discrete choice experiments.
In this dissertation, I employ discrete choice experiments, as they can be used to estimate
preferences for each attribute of electricity independently. Discrete choice experiments are
survey-based; for the purposes here, respondents choose repeatedly between hypothetical
electricity contracts that differ in their attributes. The observed choices are then used to
estimate preferences and willingness to pay values for the attributes discussed above by
regressing the attributes on choice. Discrete choice experiments have several advantages
compared to other revealed and stated preference methods. Especially for research on
preferences in the electricity sector, the following advantages are relevant: First, discrete
choice experiments enable investigation of attribute levels that do not yet exist. In India,
for example, a large share of renewable energy in the electricity mix is not readily available
to consumers. Second, it allows inference of preferences for any possible combination of
attributes and interaction effects between attributes. Third, advanced models can incorporate
the observed and unobserved heterogeneity of preferences, capturing differences between
people based on socio-demographic variables as well as differences in variables that are
unknown to the researcher. The formal theoretical background of discrete choice experiments
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is explained in more detail in Appendix A, and the discrete choice models used in the
individual papers of this dissertation are presented in the respective chapters.
1.4 Research Questions and Dissertation Structure
This dissertation consists of four papers that have used discrete choice experiments to
contribute towards better understanding of private household preferences regarding electricity
attributes in different contexts. The data come from three discrete choice experiment surveys:
one conducted in India and two in Germany. The first paper is a methodological review that
serves as the basis for the statistical analysis done for the remaining three papers, which are
all policy-oriented. One methodological and one empirical research question have guided
this research, with the empirical one being divided into two sub-research questions, one for
each geographical context. Figure 1.2 outlines the structure of the dissertation.
Methodical research question: How do electricity preferences differ within a single
context?
Empirical research question: What domains and attributes determine private house-
hold electricity preferences?
Empirical sub-research question 1: What domains and attributes determine
private household electricity preferences in India?
Empirical sub-research question 2: What domains and attributes determine
private household electricity preferences in Germany?
The methodological research question is related to the observation that preferences
can and generally do vary between people situated in the same context. Some of this
variation may be explained by observed variables such as age or household size. For example,
Indian families with small children in the household have to rely more on temperature
regulation than a single-person household, which will lead to a stronger preference among
the former for fewer power cuts. Such observed preference heterogeneity can be inferred by
inclusion of relevant variables into choice models. Yet there may remain variation between
respondents that cannot be explained by observed variables. The commonly employed
inclusion of unobserved preference heterogeneity in discrete choice models can lead to
several alternative model specifications, with each implying a different pattern of preference
distribution (Train, 2009). In order to better understand the implications of these models,
Paper 1 reviews available and easy-to-implement statistical methods for model choice. It then
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develops an agenda of procedures to identify appropriate model specifications, exemplifying
it via a statistical comparison of the two most frequently applied discrete choice models:
random parameters logit and latent class logit. Both models have in common that they
incorporate unobserved preference heterogeneity but differ in their assumptions regarding
how preferences are distributed across the population. The random parameters logit model
assumes a continuous parametric distribution of preferences, described, for example, using a
normal or log-normal distribution function. In contrast, the latent class logit model uses a
non-parametric distribution, leading to a finite number of preference classes.
The empirical research questions are addressed in the remaining three papers. Paper 2
tackles the first empirical sub-research question and is aimed at guiding policy makers in
India regarding which existing deficits in electricity supply are considered to be most harmful
to private households, which groups are being most severely affected and how the households
would like the electricity market to be (re)organized. My co-author – Kai Rommel – and
I investigated preferences regarding 1) duration of scheduled and unscheduled power cuts,
representing the what 2) share of renewable energy, representing the how; and 3) distribution
company’s organizational form – currently a government-owned monopoly – representing
the who. The results suggest, first, that preferences strongly differ across the population
and, second, that the overall willingness to pay is rather low for most consumer groups, with
only a small percentage of consumers expressing a high willingness to pay, especially for
reducing power cuts and increasing the share of renewable energy. Concerning the who, most
private households favor the status quo situation, meaning a government-owned distribution
company.
Papers 3 and 4 are related to the second empirical sub-research question. My co-
authors – Jens Rommel and Jakob Müller – and I applied discrete choice experiment data
from Germany, seeking to address the who, how, and where. As the reasons why people
have preferences regarding the governance of electricity distribution companies are not as
straightforward as for the other domains, we borrowed from New Institutional Economics
theory to extend the theoretical choice framework. Paper 3 investigates the relationship
between the organizational form of distribution companies (private, cooperative, municipality
owned) and renewable energy share. Using Akerlof’s ‘Market for Lemons’ (Akerlof, 1970),
we develop a hypothesis that distribution company governance becomes more important
to consumers when the share of renewable energy in offered energy mixes is great. The
results here show, first, that willingness to pay for more renewable energy is higher when
it is supplied by municipality-owned and cooperative distribution companies and, second,
that this difference increases with an increasing renewable energy share. Last, Paper 4
studies the governance attributes of cooperatives in more detail. Here, Transaction Cost
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Economics serves as the theoretical basis. Private households can reduce transaction costs
related to electricity supply by becoming members of a cooperative that is characterized by a
democratic structure (one member, one vote) and offers participation possibilities. Further,
most cooperatives exhibit a more transparent pricing policy and are more regionally focused
than large investor-owned companies. The results here show that, apart from renewable
energy share, it is especially price transparency and participation that affect choice and, thus,
seem to be the most important characteristics of energy cooperatives for consumers.
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Fig. 1.2 Outline of Dissertation
Chapter 2
Preference Heterogeneity in Energy
Discrete Choice Experiments (P1)
Full Title: Preference Heterogeneity in Energy Discrete Choice Experiments: A Review on
Methods for Model Selection
Authors: Julian Sagebiel
Published in: Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 69, 94, pp.804–811.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.11.138
Abstract: Discrete choice experiments are increasingly utilized to inform policy makers
in various fields in energy on consumer preferences and willingness to pay values. When
translating the results into policy recommendations, it is often difficult for non-experts to
understand the underlying implications of different models and associated behavioral assump-
tions. In this paper, I review proposed methods to compare the two most frequently applied
models, the random parameters logit and the latent class logit and investigate the challenges
in and implications of model choice for policy makers and practitioners. As an example
application, I use data from a discrete choice experiment on private households’ preferences
for electricity supply quality in Hyderabad, India. The procedures used in the comparative
analysis – measures of fit, tests for non-nested models, kernel density estimates of conditional
willingness to pay values and choice probabilities – emphasize the difficulties in finding
the ‘correct’ model. The methods presented here can be readily used by other researchers
to better understand model performance which ultimately contributes to improving model
choice in applied energy research.
Keywords: Choice Model Comparison; Random Parameters Logit; Latent Class Logit;
India; Willingness to pay

Chapter 3
Preferences for Electricity Supply
Attributes in Emerging Megacities (P2)
Full Title: Preferences for Electricity Supply Attributes in Emerging Megacities – Policy
Implications from a Discrete Choice Experiment of Private Households in Hyderabad, India
Authors: Julian Sagebiel and Kai Rommel
Published in: Energy for Sustainable Development 21, pp. 89-99
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2014.06.002
Abstract: The Indian economy struggles with electricity supply deficits and low quality
supply. Although several initiatives including demand side management measures have
already been implemented, consumers from different backgrounds suffer from various
drawbacks of quality supply. This paper explores the valuation of electricity quality from
the perspective of domestic consumers in Hyderabad, India. We conducted a discrete choice
experiment with 798 urban households. For analysis, we apply a scale-adjusted latent
class model to identify heterogeneity in preferences and in variance-scale. The results
confirm the hypothesis of highly heterogeneous household preferences and reveal limited
preparedness of domestic users to pay for improved electricity quality and renewable energy.
Further, most respondents prefer state owned distribution companies to private enterprises
or cooperative societies. We argue that the estimated preferences, implying demand and
willingness to pay for single attributes of electricity quality, can help policy makers to
adequately incorporate consumers’ interests into decision making. The results further indicate
that domestic tariff hikes should not be used to finance extension of renewable energies or
infrastructure investment to improve reliability in supply.
Keywords: Urban Electricity Supply; Discrete Choice Experiments; Stated Preferences;
Scale-Adjusted Latent Class Model; India

Chapter 4
Quality Uncertainty and the Market for
Renewable Energy (P3)
Full Title: Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Renewable Energy: Evidence from
German Consumers
Authors: Jens Rommel, Julian Sagebiel and Jakob Müller
Published in: Renewable Energy, 94, pp.106–113
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2016.03.049
Abstract: Consumers can choose from a wide range of electricity supply contracts, includ-
ing green power options. Electricity produced from renewable energy involves information
asymmetries. With a sample of more than 2,000 German electricity consumers, we tested
the proposition of a “lemon market” for renewable energy in a discrete choice experiment.
Specifically, we found that, compared to investor-owned firms, additional willingness-to-pay
for renewable energy is approximately double when offered by cooperatives or municipally-
owned electricity utilities. Consumers who are experienced with switching suppliers have an
additional willingness-to-pay of one Eurocent per kilowatt hour for cooperatives and two
Eurocents for public enterprises. The results demonstrate that organizational transformation
in dynamically-changing electricity markets is not only driven by political initiatives but also
by consumers’ choices on the market. Public policy may reduce information asymmetries by
promoting government labeling of green energy products.




Are Consumers Willing to Pay more for
Electricity from Cooperatives? (P4)
Full Title: Are Consumers Willing to Pay More for Electricity from Cooperatives? Results
from an Online Choice Experiment in Germany
Authors: Julian Sagebiel, Jakob Müller and Jens Rommel
Published in: Energy Research & Social Science 2, pp. 90-101
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.04.003
Abstract: With liberalization in 1998, numerous firms have entered the German retail
electricity market, including newly formed consumer cooperatives. Based on Transaction
Cost Economics, we develop a theoretical framework seeking to explain preferences for
electricity supplied by cooperatives from a consumer perspective. Drawing on a convenience
sample of 287 German electricity consumers and Choice Experiment data from an online
survey, we estimate Willingness-to-Pay values for organizational attributes of electricity
suppliers, while accounting for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Consumers in the
sample exhibit a large Willingness-to-Pay for renewable energy. Our results also indicate
a substantial Willingness-to-Pay for transparent pricing, participation in decision making,
and local suppliers. Democratic decision making – a distinct feature of cooperatives –
exhibits positive Willingness-to-Pay values for approximately one fifth of the sample. Taken
together, our findings suggest a slightly higher Willingness-to-Pay for electricity produced
by cooperatives. Limitations of applied sampling and other important aspects of energy
transition are also discussed.




Some skepticism about the economist’s penchant for monetary measurement is
no doubt healthy, but it should not be overdone (Freeman III et al., 2014, p.10)
To achieve sustainable electricity supply, the structure and design of electricity markets
must be adapted to local contexts. Economies of scale and the resulting natural monopolies
in transmission and distribution require market regulation and government intervention. Yet
a variety of mechanisms can also allow for privatization and competitive market structures.
Consequently, finding the right balance between freedom, competition, and market regulation
is a key challenge that policy-makers face.
Electricity is a heterogeneous good that has to fulfill different purposes for a heteroge-
neous set of stakeholders. In this domain, consumers are an important group because they
can shape demand in terms of the attributes of the electricity they use. Unlike in competitive
markets, however, electricity consumers are not able to express their preferences through
choices, as prices are either zero (e.g., externalities) or fixed. Hence, it is not clear what
particular characteristics affect consumer welfare and to what extent consumers are willing to
participate in the above-mentioned challenge to attain a sustainable electricity supply. Addi-
tionally, conditions on electricity markets differ greatly between emerging and industrialized
economies, as do the problems, needs and preferences of consumers, making it difficult to
transfer successful transformation strategies between countries. Understanding consumer
preferences and how they differ across contexts is, therefore, a difficult yet necessary task for
providing advice to policy-makers regarding the design of electricity markets.
This dissertation has addressed the question of how consumer preferences regarding
electricity attributes are shaped (empirical research question) and how much they resemble
each other between (empirical sub-research questions) and within (methodological research
question) contexts. The insights gained here seek to contribute towards finding solutions for
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achieving sustainable electricity supply by reducing the knowledge gap regarding consumer
preferences and providing methodological foundations for measurement of the value of
various electricity attributes which cannot be captured through market observations.
6.1 Results
6.1.1 Contributions of the Individual Papers
To gain a better understanding of differences regarding preferences in fixed contexts (method-
ical research question), Paper 1 has served as the methodological basis for the subsequent
papers, also providing a literature review on methods for discrete choice model selection. The
paper focused on models that can incorporate unobserved preference heterogeneity, meaning
variation of preferences between people that cannot be explained by observed variables. The
results indicate that models chosen by researchers can strongly impact estimated preferences
and willingness to pay values. For the Indian case study, preference heterogeneity was
best described using three to five distinct latent preference classes, with members within
each class having relatively homogeneous preferences. The key contribution of the paper is
improved understanding of how unobserved preference heterogeneity can be integrated into
analysis while also indicating the importance of including preference heterogeneity in policy
recommendations.
Paper 2 took up the findings on preference heterogeneity from Paper 1 and, using a
discrete choice experiment to investigate non-marketed characteristics of electricity, analyzed
the preferences of private households in the emerging megacity of Hyderabad, India (empiri-
cal sub-research question 1). The results indicate great unobserved preference heterogeneity
between respondents, the majority of whom were not willing to pay for improvements in
electricity supply or renewable energy. The policy analysis performed on this data implies
that differences in preferences should be incorporated into the design of new policies and
tariffs. For example, increasing the share of renewable energy was not perceived as being
relevant by about 90% of the respondents, but a subset of respondents was willing to pay
a substantial amount for it. Thus, decision makers can make use of this heterogeneity by
introducing an optional renewable energy tariff. Even if only a small portion of households
were to switch to such a tariff, it could be a viable solution for covering some costs for
creating additional renewable energy capacities.
Papers 3 and 4 investigated preferences regarding electricity attributes in the German
context (empirical sub-research question 2). In contrast to the Indian case, the two discrete
choice experiments conducted in Germany focused on the governance structures and locations
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of distribution companies. Paper 3 explored the interaction between the attributes ‘share
of renewable energy’ and ‘organizational form of distribution company’. Using discrete
choice experiment data from about 2,000 German households, the main finding here was
that willingness to pay for electricity from a non-profit oriented company increases when the
share of renewable energy is high. This can be said to contribute to our understanding of how
preferences are shaped and especially how they shift when the context changes, particularly
here how the introduction of renewable energy sources in the electricity mix can shift the
importance of the organizational form of an electricity distribution company for consumers.
Paper 4 provided more a more detailed discussion of the findings on electricity coop-
eratives from paper 3 and sought to investigate what exactly makes energy cooperatives
attractive for German consumers. Using a survey with about 300 respondents, a discrete
choice experiment was conducted to infer willingness to pay values for distribution com-
pany governance attributes, including some attributes typical for cooperatives. It turned out
that distribution company location and presence of attributes characterizing cooperatives
increased willingness to pay for electricity among German consumers. It was also shown
that small details in electricity market regulation, such as price transparency, can make a
difference to consumers’ willingness to pay.
6.1.2 Key Results and Implications
Taking the individual results together has led to additional insights concerning how pref-
erences are shaped and how they vary between contexts (empirical research question).
Consumer preferences are complex and taking them into account requires some care, for
the following reasons. First, in both case studies, preferences regarding specific electricity
attributes did exist, although these differed in magnitude. Consumers in Germany showed
a clear willingness to pay for improvements, while willingness to pay values for Indian
consumers were, on average, comparatively low.
Second, the hypothesis that preference can vary between consumers within a particular
context turned out to be true for both contexts and can be regarded as a general finding
that needs to be incorporated into any study of consumer preferences regarding electricity.
As Paper 1 has shown, neglecting this heterogeneity can easily lead to biased estimates
regarding preferences and misleading conclusions. For policy recommendations, the findings
on preference heterogeneity are at least as important as those on the population-averaged
preferences and willingness to pay values. In the presence of preference heterogeneity, policy
makers should avoid "one-size-fits-all" policies and provide options for consumers to choose
electricity supply as close to their individual preferences as possible. By doing so, policies
can hopefully be more effective, targeting those who can receive the highest benefits from
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expected changes. Taking the results of the three empirical papers together, for nearly all
attributes one-size-fits-all policies are not recommended.
Third, the need to mitigate climate change is differently perceived in Germany and in India.
Papers 3 and 4 indicated great willingness to pay values for renewable energy in Germany.
Contrasting this result with Paper 2, however, reveals that the great majority of Indian
consumers were not willing to pay for renewable energy, which supports the conjecture that
people from high-income countries care more about the externalities of electricity production.
This finding corresponds with the premises of the theoretical framework I have developed,
especially the hierarchy of needs concept (Maslow, 1943), as presented in Chapter 1, which
postulates that higher needs – mitigation of climate change, for example – only become
relevant after basic needs – here physical electricity access and quality – have been satisfied.
This result has important implications for the key challenge to bringing together climate
change mitigation and electricity availability: Providing assistance for satisfying basic needs,
which includes electricity availability and quality, appears to be a precondition for consumer
participation in an energy transition and climate change mitigation. Consequently, policies
that promote renewable energy in India need to be designed completely differently than in
Germany to find acceptance among the population, as the observation from Germany that
people will voluntarily contribute towards renewable energy production cannot be expected
in present-day India.
Fourth, the organizational form of electricity distribution companies matters, for Indian
as well as for German private households. According to the data, respondents from both
countries prefer government-owned companies. Private companies are not the optimal
organizational form for distribution companies from a consumer perspective. In Germany,
this may be one of the reasons why several municipally-owned distribution companies have
successfully entered the market. Moreover, the results from Paper 3 have revealed that
willingness to pay for renewable energy depends on the organizational form of a distribution
company. This finding has implications for the design of policies and market restructuring
in India as well as other emerging economies: Once competitive retail markets have been
established and consumers can choose their distribution company, state-owned companies can
still play an important role in facilitating the extension of renewable energy, as the likelihood
that consumers will switch to a renewable energy tariff is greater when it is produced by a
state-owned company. However, contrasting the results of Paper 2 with Paper 4 regarding
cooperatives, perceptions and preferences differ between Indian and German consumers.




Although the discrete choice experiment results presented here may be useful for informing
policy, there are several limitations that need to be considered by researchers and decision
makers so as to hinder misunderstandings. Discrete choice experiments have often been
criticized for their hypothetical nature, which can lead to ‘hypothetical bias’. Several studies
have emphasized that, in many cases, willingness to pay from discrete choice experiments is
overstated, meaning it is larger than true willingness to pay (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2001;
Herriges et al., 2010; Loomis, 2011). Especially when discrete choice experiment results are
used to inform policy, it is crucial to make such potential bias explicit. The results presented
here are no exception, and is thus likely that the stated willingness to pay values have a larger
magnitude than the true ones.
Point estimates derived from statistical analysis in the social sciences strongly depend on
theoretical assumptions adopted, model specification, data quality, and sampling strategy.
Providing specific recommendations solely on the basis of point estimates of willingness to
pay values would thus imply spurious levels of accuracy and would likely be misleading.
Therefore, it is not recommended to pin down exact willingness to pay values. Rather, it is
more important to understand the direction and magnitude of preferences as well as revealed
trade-offs between attributes. Nevertheless, strategies do exist for avoiding this spurious
accuracy trap. First, researchers can report lower and upper bounds of willingness to pay
and provide ranges in subsequent cost-benefit analyses. Second, if the purpose of discrete
choice experiments is to provide recommendations regarding a specific policy, then building
stronger links to local conditions and affected people when designing such experiments is
likely to provide more accurate results, though this strategy comes at the cost of generality.
Third, if exact willingness to pay values for certain attributes are required, a follow-up survey
on a smaller scale should then be conducted (Sagebiel et al., 2015).
Another limiting condition is that choices made in stated preference surveys can be
subject to the strategic behavior and interactions of consumers. Particularly attributes having
public-good characteristics need be interpreted with care, as potential bias due to free-riding
possibilities are not addressed in stated preference surveys. Would choices be different if
respondents were aware of the choices made by other respondents? Would people free ride if
they knew that other people were willing to pay? Such questions cannot be answered with
discrete choice experiments, but one could complement the results with game-theoretical
concepts and economic experiments to investigate strategic behavior and identify dilemmas
of coordination and cooperation (Rommel, 2015). A particular example relevant here is
climate change mitigation, which is a public good that, as theory would predict, rational
agents are not likely to invest in. Experimental economics has shown, however, that in many
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cases people may be willing to voluntarily invest in it, but not to a large enough extent
to reach efficiency (Höfer and Rommel, 2015; Zelmer, 2003). For the results presented
here, this could imply that willingness to pay is understated and, at least partly, subject to
individual rational behavior.
I am aware that the discrete choice experiments presented in this dissertation have
captured only a limited number of attributes, so it has not been possible to provide an
exhaustive analysis of all relevant electricity attributes. The main reason for this limitation
is inherent to the method used. It is usually not advisable to use more than seven attributes
per survey, as including more attributes could overburden a respondent’s cognitive abilities
and may lead to more random choices and higher drop-out rates (Louviere et al., 2006).
As a remedy, my co-authors and I have tried to identify the most relevant attributes for
private households in extensive pretests, but the necessary neglecting of other attributes
should be taken into consideration when using the results for decision-making. For policy
makers, it is often helpful to overview preferences for a large number of attributes. Here,
meta-studies summarizing preferences for electricity can be a useful tool. In the field of
electricity, meta-studies have been conducted regarding preferences for renewable energy
production (Ma et al., 2015; Menegaki, 2008; Soon and Ahmad, 2015; Sundt and Rehdanz,
2015), but the literature on the domains of who, what and where is not yet sufficiently large
enough to conduct meta-studies.
There is evidence that preferences differ by geographical locations (Campbell et al., 2008;
Johnston and Ramachandran, 2014; Meyerhoff, 2013; Schaafsma et al., 2013), which can be
traced back to socio-economic and landscape-related variables. Further, spatial autocorrela-
tion is likely to exist for willingness to pay values. Incorporating spatial heterogeneity can
be important for identifying willingness to pay hot spots, meaning locations where people
have very strong preferences regarding certain attributes. For example, in hot areas, people
are likely to have greater preferences for avoiding power cuts, because they depend more
on cooling devices than people in cooler areas. Spatial aspects of willingness to pay are an
important source of preference heterogeneity, and explicit modeling and mapping of spatial
willingness to pay can guide policy makers regarding locations where a policy could be most
useful or cost-effective. Integrating spatial elements into discrete choice experiments can also
help in transferring estimated values to other sites where no primary data collection has taken
place. Under the term ‘benefit transfer’, this approach has become popular in environmental
economics (Bateman et al., 2011, 1999; Johnston et al., 2015) but has not yet been applied in
the energy sector.
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6.3 Policy Recommendations
This dissertation seeks to contribute towards solving the global challenge of achieving sustain-
able energy provision by bringing together two contrasting aims: mitigating climate change
while, at the same time, increasing electricity availability. The policy recommendations
presented here have been derived with this goal in mind. In the following, I offer a summary
report regarding how the results and insights gained through the research presented here can
contribute towards the challenges currently facing policies aimed at achieving sustainable
energy.
6.3.1 The Case of India
In India, the ambitious policy goal of achieving full electrification on a low-carbon path
is yet to be realized. Currently, the National Action Plan on Climate Change is the most
important governmental program for reducing carbon dioxide emissions (Ghosh, 2009).
Out of its five missions, two are related to energy: the National Solar Mission and the
Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency (Harish and Raghavan, 2011). In parallel, the
Government of India has taken several steps towards increasing electricity availability and
rural electrification, such as under the scheme “Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana”
for rural electrification (Government of India, 2014). Although rural electrification as well
as overall power availability has increased over the last few years, comprehensive access to
electricity throughout India is still a major challenge.
Integrate energy policy with other development goals
To achieve a successful energy transition in India, energy policy needs to go hand in hand
with appropriate solutions to other developmental challenges, such as reduction of extreme
poverty. Thus, in addition to subsidizing renewable energy, the government should invest in
policies to enhance development. Moreover, economic growth needs to be more inclusive so
that the lower classes can also benefit from it (The World Bank, 2006). Core public services
such as health care, education and water supply should be extended to broader layers of
the population. Redesigning labor regulations, improving technologies and infrastructure
in the agricultural sector, and providing access to markets are all preconditions for energy
sector transformation. These suggestions should be addressed in the National Solar Mission,
which promotes decentralized investment in solar photovoltaic technologies for private
households but which, until now, has only progressed very slowly (Choragudi, 2013; Harish
and Raghavan, 2011; Urpelainen and Yoon, 2015).
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Reconsider privatization
Preferences regarding the organization of the electricity market in India are quite different
to preferences from other countries which have successfully initiated electricity market
reforms through privatization. In India, the majority of private households would prefer
the state to organize electricity supply, and privatization is regarded as negative. Therefore,
any efforts towards privatization should be carefully considered, as they are likely to have
limited support from the population. The National Solar Mission supports private players
in electricity generation through subsidy payments. But, considering consumer preferences,
it would perhaps be more effective if the government directly generates and distributes
electricity from solar energy to achieve better acceptance and participation. In this way,
policy makers could pave the way for state-owned companies to generate and distribute
electricity from renewable sources.
Offer tariff variety
Policy makers should also consider the observation that preferences differ between people
and should be reflected in policy design and consumer tariffs. Consumers should be offered a
variety of options for voluntarily contributing towards the extension of renewable energy. For
example, consumers could have the option of choosing between feed-in tariffs, renewable
energy tariffs and dynamic tariffs. A feed-in tariff, such as that implemented in Germany,
would provide incentives to private households to invest into decentralized renewable energy
production facilities, e.g. rooftop solar photovoltaic panels, thereby guaranteeing households
sale of their excess electricity to the grid for a fixed price. A feed-in tariff could be especially
attractive for settled residents. In contrast, a renewable energy tariff would give households
the possibility to buy electricity from renewable energy sources without investing into
privately-owned solar photovoltaic panels. This is a viable option for consumers who
want to avoid long-term investments but still want to contribute towards renewable energy
expansion. Finally, a dynamic tariff could help to reduce peak loads and increase demand
when electricity generation is high, allowing consumers to adapt their consumption to current
electricity prices, based on supply and demand, on the generation market and would be
especially attractive to higher-income households using multiple appliances. By offering
these three options, different consumer groups can contribute, based on their individual
preferences and circumstances.
In general, providing more choices to the consumer will likely increase consumer welfare,
as individual preferences would be better met. This would facilitate the extension of renew-
able energy production as more options for participation in the energy transition become
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available for consumers. Such options can be incorporated into national-level policies, such
as the Electricity Act (see Paper 2), or the National Solar Mission.
6.3.2 The Case of Germany
The German energy transition is already in progress, though new challenges have emerged.
Key problems here revolve around how decentralized electricity supply can be organized,
how consumers can be integrated into decision making and how the additional costs of
generation and distribution can be recovered. Regarding the ambitious aims of the German
government to attain a renewable energy generation rate of 80% by 2050 (UBA, 2013a), new
ways for promoting electricity from renewable energy sources among private households are
needed. A key finding of this dissertation has revealed a large excess of willingness to pay
for renewable energy which has not been fully exploited. A reason for this appears to be
that the institutional and regulatory setting has not yet been optimized from the consumer
perspective (UBA, 2010).
Provide flexibility in retail electricity markets
The introduction of new concepts such as demand-response models, energy-efficient appli-
ances, and decentralized generation require solutions which can allow consumers to make
individual choices. Policy makers should thus develop channels for making adoption of
these concepts easier for consumers, as only then can efficiency gains from addressing
heterogeneity in preferences be captured. Such a development could be set in motion parallel
to taking steps for reducing the German Renewable Energy Act apportionment for renewable
energy, a one-size-fits-all compulsory tariff for financing renewable energy (Federal Ministry
for Economic Affairs and Energy, 2012). An example of including preference heterogeneity
would be dynamic tariffs tied to market dynamics, responding to varying levels of electricity
production from renewable sources. Even if a large majority may not be interested in such
a tariff, some people would be likely to switch to it, thus reducing the demand gap when
renewable energy production is low and vice versa. Once such a system has been established
and consumers become acquainted with it, these concepts can be mainstreamed on electricity
markets.
Consider financing mechanisms
The existence of preference heterogeneity has implications for financing policies. A policy
can be financed by lump-sum payments or taxes collected from the whole population, such
as the German Renewable Energy Act apportionment, where electricity consumers pay a
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top-up for each unit of electricity consumed to finance renewable energy production, or
through usage-bound or voluntary payments, such as renewable energy tariffs. If the benefits
of a policy are relatively similarly distributed within a population, lump-sum payments can
be used. As soon as preference heterogeneity is present, however, policy makers should
consider further financing mechanisms based on voluntary payments. In Papers 3 and 4,
I have shown that preferences regarding renewable energy strongly vary between German
consumers. An advisable strategy here is to use a lump-sum payment to retrieve the minimum
required financing for achieving the government’s targets for renewable energy generation
and, additionally, offer an option for voluntary payments that would finance further extension
of the policy.
Promote labeling for renewable energy and make its production more transparent
The research presented here has identified a lack of trust in renewable energy production
when supplied by distribution companies. Consumers do seem willing to pay for renewable
energy but are hesitant, as they cannot control its quality. At the moment, this trust is
being partly regained by cooperatives and municipally-owned distribution companies, but
introduction of an accountable label, as has been done for example in the organic food market,
could boost trust in the generation process and thus help to increase the overall share of
renewable energy.
Decrease market-entry barriers for energy cooperatives
My research has identified additional willingness to pay for attributes which are typically
associated with cooperatives. As cooperatives focus in most cases on renewable energy
generation, they could be an energy transition facilitator. In this vein, removing market-entry
barriers to the retail market for cooperatives may drive consumers towards switching to
renewable energy tariffs. The planned reform of the current renewable energy act would
substitute the existing feed-in tariff with open competitive bidding for wind energy projects.
In theory, such a system should increase market efficiency but would make long-term
planning difficult for smaller cooperatives and increase investment risk in them (Bündnis
Bürgerenergie, 2016). Open competitive bidding does not take into account that consumers
perceive renewable energy differently, depending on who provides it. As indicated in Papers
3 and 4, an important factor for consumers when deciding whether to switch to a renewable
energy tariff is how the company that supplies it is organized. In the worst case scenario,
small cooperatives that are unable to compete will leave the market and consumer willingness
to pay for renewable energy would then likely decrease. Here, policy makers could offer
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support for cooperatives so that they would be able to compete with large companies that
benefit from economies of scale and have better possibilities for hedging risky investments.
6.4 Outlook: Uses of Discrete Choice Experiments in En-
ergy Policy
In this last section of my dissertation, I will elaborate on the usefulness of discrete choice
experiments for decision makers and discuss their various uses in policy contexts. Are
discrete choice experiments a meaningful tool for decision makers? What can discrete choice
experiments regarding the electricity sector contribute to policy?
Laurans et al. (2013) have identified categories of use within the context of valuation of
ecosystem services. I have taken their approach as a basis for examining uses concerning
the specific case of electricity and provided examples from the four papers that make up this
dissertation. In general, there are three main purposes for discrete choice experiments within
policy-making contexts. First, they can be used by decision makers to identify trade-offs
between policy options. Second, they can be used to adjust existing policies or regulations.
Third, they provide general information regarding public preferences and can be used for
long-term policy planning.
Identify trade-offs of policy alternatives: When policy makers are about to implement
a new policy or regulation, they need to consider several factors and, under limited budgets,
are often forced into trading-off between alternatives. Discrete choice experiments can help
to identify the value of these trade-offs by providing costs and benefits for each alternative.
For example, Paper 2 has identified the trade-offs between scheduled and unscheduled power
cuts. In a policy to reduce power cuts, a policy maker can use such results to decide whether
the focus of the policy should be put more on reducing scheduled or unscheduled power cuts.
The results of the discrete choice experiment presented here indicate that people in India
would prefer a reduction of scheduled power cuts more than of unscheduled power cuts and
have implicitly provided a measurable value for this trade off by their estimated willingness
to pay values. Such results can be readily integrated into policy-making processes. However,
this approach does need to be applied with care, due to the spurious accuracy trap explained
in section 6.2
Fine-tune policy: Once a policy is decided upon and about to be implemented, discrete
choice experiments can be used for fine-tuning. For example, implementation of the German
Renewable Energy Act apportionment for renewable energy could benefit from the results
of a discrete choice experiment. Based on the maximum willingness to pay values for
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renewable energy, the values of the apportionment could then be adapted. If, for example,
the apportionment is below the maximum willingness to pay, then promoting a more rapid
extension of renewable energy sources could be considered. In the opposite case, either take
steps (e.g., through marketing efforts) could be taken to increase acceptance or effort could
be put into finding different financing options for renewable energy.
Support decision making: For many purposes, accurate trade-off values are not required.
Rather, policy makers are interested in integrating results into their decision-making process
or using them as inputs for discussions. Willingness to pay values can be used as arguments
for setting the priorities of a certain policy. For example, Paper 3 suggests that renewable
energy share can be more easily increased when channeled through municipally-owned
distribution companies or cooperatives than via large private companies. Policy aimed
towards increasing renewable energy share can thus make use of such information for
supporting market entry for cooperatives, in the expectation that more people will then switch
to a renewable energy tariff.
Support marketing and management strategies for distribution companies: Results
from discrete choice experiments can also be used by distribution companies, which can
then adapt their tariff structures and their products to better meet consumer preferences.
Further, they can also use such results for designing internal policies regarding issues such
as price transparency. In marketing, such results can help to publicly emphasize company
characteristics that are especially valued by consumers. For example, in Paper 4 I concluded
that options for customer participation increase their willingness to pay. Consequently,
companies may want to discuss opening themselves up to consumer participation in its
decision-making process, thereby increasing their attractiveness for new customers.
Verify existing policies: Discrete choice experiment results can be used ex-post, after a
policy has been implemented. Especially when a policy has been publicly criticized, such
results can be used to reassess the criticism as, in many cases, estimated preferences come
from representative surveys and mirror the opinions of relevant segments of the population.
As a case in point, the results of Papers 3 and 4, indicating high willingness to pay values for
renewable energy, could be used to justify the German Renewable Energy Act apportionment
for renewable energy.
Raise awareness of policy makers: In many cases, policy makers do not have a clear
picture of consumer preferences, which could result in inaccurate perceptions regarding them.
Discrete choice experiment results could raise awareness of policy makers regarding relevant
topics. For example, the result from Paper 1 that preference heterogeneity is present in most
energy-related topics could help to make policy makers aware that one-size-fits-all policies
are likely to lead to acceptance issues.
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Evaluate the status quo: Designing new policies is generally based on the assumption
that already existing policies are suboptimal. Discrete choice experiments can help to verify
or disprove this assumption. For example, the experiment conducted in Paper 2 showed
that the majority of respondents in India would like to maintain the status quo of electricity
regulation. For a policy maker, this could be taken to mean that policy reform towards
privatization is not likely to have much value for private households or that further efforts
to create acceptance among the population regarding privatization would be required. It
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Appendix A
Econometric Background of Discrete
Choice Experiments
A.1 Economic Model
The dissertation investigates preferences and subsequent demand for goods that are not
available on a market. These preferences are similarly shaped as those for marketed goods
allowing classical consumer theory to be the foundation of the econometric framework. The
main difference to standard theory is that discrete choices rather than continuous choices
are to be modeled. When it comes to the choice of a supply company, a consumer only
chooses one company and receives his electricity completely from there. All models applied
in this dissertation deal with the discrete choice of a consumer. Hanemann et al. (1984) has
laid the foundation of demand systems for discrete choice. In general, so he argues, are
consumers faced with a two-stage decision process of discrete and continuous choices. First,
the consumer decides which good she wants, then how much of it she consumes. Hanemann
showed how discrete choices can be modeled consistently to the assumptions of neoclassical
preference theory.
In many cases, we are not only interested in the good itself (e.g. distribution company
A or distribution company B) but in the characteristics of the good. What is it that makes
company A being preferred to company B and what can company B do to change this?
In their seminal works, Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974) constructed a framework that
explicitly models demand as a function of the attributes of a good rather than the good itself.
Lancaster uses the example of a bulb. It is not the bulb that the consumer is interested in,
it is the light that it gives. And it is also the time when light is required. Utility is hence
derived from light at a certain time. More generally, the utility derived from electricity is a
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function of its characteristics. These characteristics can either directly affect the consumer,
e.g., the frequency of power cuts, or indirectly, like the share of renewable energy or the type
of distribution company.
Combining the approaches from Hanemann, Lancaster and Rosen leads to the theoretical
model (Alpizar et al., 2003; Louviere et al., 2006) which I used throughout the dissertation. It
can be described as follows: an individual i derives utility from the consumption of electricity
as well as from a numeraire good z, which is fixed and comes at a price of 1. Electricity is
a complex good that is modeled as a contract with a distribution company and, following
Lancaster and Rosen, is a function of its characteristics. The contract c is thus c = f (A)
where A is a vector of characteristics. Formally the optimization problem is given as







θnθm = 0, ∀ n ̸= m (A.3)
z ≥ 0,ci(An)≥ 0 for at least one n (A.4)
where
• U is a quasi concave utility function
• θ is an indicator whether the contract has been bought or not
• n is the index for the different contracts
• cn(An) is a contract with attribute vector An
• pn is the corresponding price of the alternative
• z is the numeraire and y is income (both fixed)
The utility function is assumed to be at least weakly separable so that
U = (u(c1,z), ...,u(cn,z)) (A.5)
Taking into account equations A.3 and A.2 one can derive the indirect utility function V
V (A, p,y) = max[u1(A1,y− p1c1), ...,uN(AN ,y− pNcN)] (A.6)
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The indirect utility function gives the highest attainable utility under given prices and
income.
From V it follows that a consumer chooses contract m if
um(Am,y− pmcm)> un(An,y− pncn) ∀ n ̸= m (A.7)
This theoretical model can be transformed to a random utility model (Manski, 1977;
Thurstone, 1927) and utility parameters (i.e. the effect of the characteristics on utility)
estimated with discrete choice models such as the conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974).
In all papers of the dissertation I applied this framework as the theoretical foundation of
choice. The main difference is the specification of c, that is the utility relevant characteristics
of the contract.
A.2 Methods to Estimate Demand Functions for Non-Market
Goods
In order to measure preferences and demand for non-market goods, several methods exist.
The literature distinguishes between revealed and stated preferences. Revealed preferences
are useful when transactions on a market can be directly or indirectly observed. For example,
the demand for units of electricity can be easily estimated by observing prices and quantities
over time. In other circumstances, such data are not available. The demand for better
electricity quality is not easily observable. The electricity quality does usually not vary
within a region, and there is no market where one can buy electricity quality. Revealed
preferences can only be used in a limited way. A popular way to estimate demand for
non-market goods is to ask a sample of the population to state their preferences. Such
hypothetical decisions are contested because it may introduce several biases, yet many
researchers consider it as the only way to obtain such data. Two stated preference methods
have been frequently applied in the electricity sector: contingent valuation surveys and
discrete choice experiments. Both methods are survey-based, and infer willingness to pay
values. In contingent valuation, respondents are directly asked to state their willingness to
pay, whereas in discrete choice experiments, the researcher asks the respondent to repeatedly
choose between different alternatives. These alternatives describe the good by a combination
of several characteristics. In this dissertation, the good electricity quality is described for
example by the characteristics number of power cuts, share of renewable energy and type of
supply company. Discrete choice models then allow to calculate willingness to pay values
for each characteristic separately, expanding the informative value of the survey.
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A.3 Estimating Utility Functions and Willingness to Pay
Having the theoretical framework – which is valid for all stated and revealed preference
methods – fixed, then next step is to derive an econometric model, that can be estimated
with available data. In the following, I will briefly outline this derivation for discrete choice
experiments. For other revealed and stated preferences methods, the procedure is analogous.
Recall the decision rule from equation A.7. This model is deterministic and assumes that
all relevant factors that influence choice are captured. Yet, in practice, we can only observe
some characteristics, that led to a choice. To make the model operational, we have to add
an unobserved part that captures all effects that have influenced the choice, but that are not
observed (by the researcher). It is common to specify the unobserved part as εn entering the
utility function additively, so that
um(Am,y− pmcm)+ εm > un(An,y− pncn)+ εn ∀ n ̸= m (A.8)
Rearranging leads to
εm − εn > un(An,y− pncn)−um(Am,y− pmcm) ∀ n ̸= m (A.9)
Assuming that εm − εn follows a probability distribution, we can write the term in
probabilities
Rearranging leads to
Prob{choose contract m}=Prob{εm−εn > un(An,y− pncn)−um(Am,y− pmcm)} ∀ n ̸=m
(A.10)
Assuming that all ε are independently and identically distributed (iid) with a Extreme
Value Type I distribution, leads to McFadden’s seminal Conditional Logit model (McFadden,
1974) as





This model can be estimated with the maximum likelihood method and due to its compu-
tational simplicity serves as the basis and workhorse for estimation of discrete choice models.
As the model is subject several (unrealistic) assumptions, it has been extended, leading
to more complex models by relaxing especially the iid assumption to allow for different
correlation structures of the error terms. By doing so, it is, for example, possible to model
unobserved preference heterogeneity. In the dissertation, I explicitly focused on these models
and also investigate the methodical challenges that arise by using such models.
